Implicit Theories of Morality, Personality, and Contextual Factors in Moral Appraisal by Hojbotă, Ana Maria
Symposion, 1, 2 (2014): 191-221 
 
Implicit Theories of Morality, Personality, 
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Abstract: This article explores the implicit theories of morality, or the 
conceptions regarding the patterns of stability, continuity and change in moral 
dispositions, both in lay and academic discourses. The controversies 
surrounding these conceptions and the fragmentation of the models and 
perspectives in metaethics and moral psychology endangers the pursuit of 
adequate operationalizations of morally relevant constructs. The current 
debate between situationists, who deny that character is an useful concept for 
understanding human behavior, which is better explained by contextual factors 
(Doris 1998; Harman 1998) and dispositionists, who advocate the cross-
situational stability of traits, is also present in the lay discourse, through the 
existence of competing commonsense ontological assumptions regarding the 
mutability or alterability of moral features, namely the implicit theories 
perspective (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997). These personal theories are the 
primary suspects in the affective and cognitive reactions to transgressions: the 
type of attended information in formulating evaluative judgments, the 
calibration of moral responsibility and blameworthiness, the assignment of 
retribution or reparatory recommendations to transgressors. In the second 
part of the study we attempt to advance toward a more fine-grained inspection 
of these lay beliefs, arguing that the construct of implicit theories of morality, as 
it is currently treated and measured, tends to be restrictive and 
oversimplifying. 




Research on the sources of variability regarding the attribution of moral traits 
and the views on moral character, either implicit or explicit, cannot be complete, 
nor entirely legitimate without situating the different perspectives into 
corresponding philosophical frames. Research in social psychology on person 
perception, more specifically, on implicit theories of morality (Chiu, Dweck, 
Tong, and Fu 1997; Dweck 1991; Dweck, Chiu, and Hong 1995; Miller, Burgoon, 
and Hall 2007), and on essentialist beliefs (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, and Kashima 
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2006) reveals that people generally tend to be oriented either towards a 
situational, contextual view of moral conduct, or a more trait-based vision of 
morality. This strand of research has been generally conducted without paying 
attention to philosophical accounts that discuss concepts such as character, 
human nature, traits, virtues, vices and the complicated relation between the 
individual and environment. This isolated approach led to a weak psychological 
account of moral lay thinking and to an inflation of terms and concepts from the 
moral domain.  
Bridging the domains of personality, person perception and moral 
psychology, these theories are important for all three directions of research, 
bringing light upon the consistency of moral behavior, on how people interpret 
morally relevant situations and make assumptions about the people they 
observe and how identity builds on these types of mechanisms. 
Spontaneous or analytical descriptive statements of character, 
explanations and predictions of future behavior are filtered by these 
interpretative lenses that some authors call implicit or naïve theories. They are 
supposed to calibrate the amount of blame, responsibility and the valence of 
normative judgments regarding human behaviors. Before discussing the 
implications of each perspective, we will first inspect the main philosophical 
accounts that diverge on the legitimacy and explanatory power of character 
traits and of situations. The fragmentation of the models describing the nature of 
human morality points to the inherent complexity of the phenomena. There is 
considerable variability in the views of the lay thinker, which points to the 
difficulties faced by the scholars in the field of morality. Confronted with the 
atomization of perspectives, models and operational definitions, the novices in 
this field may be discouraged when they approach the issue of moral evaluative 
judgments.  
Based on the suggestions offered by the philosophical literature and the 
debates that emerged in psychology, we propose a way in which the 
understanding of implicit theories of morality could be improved, arguing for a 
more accurate measurement of moral theories and conceptions. We extend 
Dweck’s model of implicit theories applied to morality in a few critical ways: a) 
by discussing the nature of moral trait attributions, as an automatic, pervasive 
process that inform all the rational and unconscious operations in behavior 
evaluation; b) by suggesting that the approach of moral traits should take into 
account the valence of these traits, since they activate different representational 
information; c) by segregating the incremental-entity dichotomy into further 
dimensions, relating to two sets of distinct but associated phenomena: the 
opposition between processes of consolidation and those related to degradation 
of character traits; distinguishing among morally blameworthy and 
praiseworthy changes in behavior, virtues and character strengths, on the one 
hand, and bad habits or vices on the other hand. 
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The Moralistic Instinct. The Pervasiveness of Moral Attribution 
“The only difference between the saint and the sinner is that every saint has a 
past, and every sinner has a future.” Oscar Wilde’s popular quote could be 
understood as an indication of the human tendency towards evaluating people 
based on character labels. It also depicts the relativity of these traits in 
describing persons and predicting a future moral conduct. This kind of 
dichotomous thinking, however, seems to be especially appealing for the human 
mind. People need to believe in saints or sinners, heroes or villains, and their 
mind seems to be automatically attuned to identifying antagonists, be they 
scapegoats or saviors, tendencies that are well reflected in the vast majority of 
cultural products. Wilde’s words also point to the inherent complexity of 
assessing moral behavior and self-regulation, a feature which discouraged 
eminent psychologists from approaching the issue, such as the founding father of 
personality psychology, Gordon Allport (1937). Allport overtly expressed a view 
according to which morality cannot be a suitable object of psychological inquiry. 
Without adhering to this kind of skepticism, we approach this domain 
acknowledging the lack of consensus, incomplete explanatory models and 
paradoxical findings.  
Some philosophers attempted to reject the magnetic appeal of reductionist 
virtue-based conceptions as those suggested by Wilde’s words. For instance, 
Christine Korsgaard mockingly labels the “good dog” view of the moral person in 
contrast to the similarly popular prototype of the “reformed miserable sinner.” 
According to Korsgaard, the “good dog” view of the virtuous agent as an 
individual equipped with “desires and inclinations” that “have been so perfectly 
trained that he always does what he ought to do spontaneously and with tail-
wagging cheerfulness and enthusiasm” (Korsgaard 2009, 3) contrasts the second 
view, according to which the individual continuously faces “unruly desires in 
order to conform to the demands of duty” (Korsgaard 2009, 3). These two views 
are both theoretically sterile and methodologically inoperable and illustrate the 
inherent tendencies and limitations of folk epistemology, in an area where 
humans seem to be innately equipped with the necessary assessment tools for 
discerning “good dogs” from bad ones. Although rudimentary, these evaluative 
tools show high sensitivity to a variety of factors, prioritizing egotistical and 
evaluative motivations over epistemic ones. 
Since the onset of the cognitivist revolution, social psychologists discuss 
the tendency to attach moral intentions, emotions and moral character traits, 
even to inanimate objects. For instance, Heider and Simmel’s experiment from 
1944 asked subjects to describe geometrical shapes that executed successive 
movements, in an attempt to present “situations and activity without the face” 
(Heider and Simmel 1944, 244). A large triangle, a small triangle and a circle 
moved in various directions during the 2½ min film presented to the 
participants. Subjects were asked to describe the figures as if they were persons 
(e.g. “What kind of person is the big triangle?”). Although providing various 
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scenarios for the displayed scenes, participants judged the “characters” of 
geometrical shapes “with great uniformity” (Heider and Simmel 1944, 248), 
either as aggressive, bad-tempered, troublesome or as mean, in the case of the 
big triangle, or heroic and courageous, as the small triangle was frequently 
depicted.  
This tendency to make normative (right/wrong) or axiological (good/bad) 
judgments is supposed to evolve very early in the course of ontogenetic 
development, prior to the development of language. This was illustrated by a 
study conducted by Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom (2007). In this experiment, 
toddlers of six and ten months watched a series of visual scenarios. They 
designed a set of simple scenes, where the main characters were “interpreted” 
by large wood shapes with large googly eyes, struggling to climb up a hill. Other 
shapes either supported and helped the climber, or trumped his climbing efforts, 
throwing them down. When the experiment ended, the toddlers reached for the 
helpers, indicating a significantly greater preference for them than for the 
hinderers. The authors concluded that the preference for pro-social actors is 
universal and innate, and manifests itself prior to the acquisition of language or 
higher-order reasoning. These studies indicate that people readily form 
impressions of the objects they observe and that these impressions are mainly 
translated in characterial terms:  
The capacity to evaluate individuals by their social actions may also serve as a 
foundation for a developing system of moral cognition. Plainly, many aspects of 
a full-fledged moral system are beyond the preverbal infant. Yet the ability to 
judge differentially those who perform positive and negative social acts may 
form an essential basis for any system that will eventually contain more 
abstract concepts of right or wrong. The social evaluations we have observed in 
our young subjects have (at least) one crucial component of genuine moral 
judgments: they do not stem from infants’ won experiences with the actors 
involved. Our subjects had no previous history with our characters, nor did 
they themselves experience any consequences of these characters’ actions. 
Their evaluations were made on the basis of witnessed interactions between 
unknown individuals: the infant, as an unaffected, unrelated (and therefore 
unbiased) third party, is nonetheless rendering a judgment about the value of a 
social act (Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2007, 558-559).  
The authors maintain that this basic evaluative competence is based upon 
the fact that people constantly need to “make accurate decisions about who is 
friend and who is foe, who is an appropriate social partner and who is not” 
(Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom 2007, 557). This tendency towards automatic moral 
evaluation is comprehensively discussed by Jonathan Haidt in his explorations 
on self-righteousness.  
Jonathan Haidt is the proponent of a multidimensional notion of morality, 
as an evaluative “organ” with six kinds of different receptors, called moral 
foundations. He describes a propensity that looks like an obsession for “self-
righteousness,” a tendency that, in his opinion, provided human species with the 
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possibility of forming cooperative groups but also led to one of the human 
nature’s greatest flaw, the tendency of people to become hypocrites, convinced 
of their own virtue. This approach is best developed in his latest and 
controversial book, The Righteous Mind. Why Good People Are Divided by Religion 
and Politics, where he claims that human nature is not only intrinsically moral, 
but also highly moralistic, in other words, has a natural tendency to be critical, 
self-righteous, and judgmental. Thus, righteousness becomes a central feature of 
the human thinking, especially about social objects. Explaining its etymology, 
Haidt shows that the term comes from the Hebrew term Tzedek that refers to 
God’s moral evaluation of people. This divine act of judgment, specific to the 
creator, is regarded as harsh, but also inherently just. The word applies to the 
way people reflect on the acts of others, including the meaning of intransigence 
and impartiality. 
This universal tendency is also expressed by other authors, who maintain 
that human beings have an embedded tool of moral assessment that evolved to 
accurately detect and deter potential enemies, or persons that could act in ways 
that could be leaving intentional harm upon them. Some authors maintain that 
all ethical decisions can be seen as character-related: “the basic judgments in 
ethics are judgments about character,” a view that has been gradually gaining 
currency (Statman 1997, 7). This tendency makes sense in an evolutionary 
framework.  
People who cause harm intentionally are, in general, far more dangerous than 
people who cause harm accidentally, and therefore is more important to deter 
them (Greene 2013).  
Intentionality thus becomes a central feature of this evaluative moral module. 
Joshua Greene points also to the fact that naïve moral epistemology, which is 
inherently dominated by this disposition towards self-righteousness, can be 
conceived as coherentist rather than foundationalist (Greene 2013). People 
rarely tend to judge the morality of an action in isolation, based on the proof 
regarding intentionality and blame alone, and the temptation to appeal to 
character judgments is overtly recognized and sometimes actively controlled. 
For instance, in some legal contexts, jurors are not provided evidence regarding 
the record of the defendant in order to avoid biased evaluation.  We further 
discuss to what extent people endorse this dichotomous pattern and thinking 
about character, its adequacy and other issues related to naïve moral thinking. 
Saints and sinners, situationists and dispositionists 
While there is growing evidence that the morphology of folk moral psychology, 
at least in Western contexts, tends to be trait-based, it is not clear how lay people 
conceptualize the direction and depth of the changes that orient the 
development of moral character. It is this specific type of views on behavioral 
modification that vary from skeptical to more melioristic positions, that we are 
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expecting to affect positions regarding the allocation and punishment, and the 
shape of educational and remedial interventions. 
In their paper “Sinning Saints and Saintly Sinners: The Paradox of Moral 
Self-Regulation,” Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin (2009) pointed that many moral as 
well as immoral behaviors stem from people’s attempts at finding the balance 
between competing forces, stressing that rather than labeling people as either 
sinners or saints, a more accurate view would be to say that people are 
frequently swinging between “sinning saint” and “saintly sinner” states. This 
inherent duality is also metaphorically expressed in an expression proposed by 
Phillip Zimbardo, “the Lucifer effect,” largely discussed in his homonymous book. 
Zimbardo seems to embrace a compromise view of the human nature, proposing 
a model of “situated character transformations,” that aims to push the reader 
further away from “the comfortable separation of Your Good and Faultless Side 
from Their Evil and Wicked Side” (Zimbardo 2007, 3). This account resembles 
more recent accounts in social psychology that sanctions absolute, isolated 
evaluations of people’s behavior, stemming only from universal principles, and 
disregarding the context. Such a model, the socio-relational model of morality 
(Rai and Fiske 2011), indicates that all moral practices and motives are 
contextualized and that behaviors can be judged either as moral or immoral 
depending on the perspective from which they are interpreted.  
But unlike the fair to mild, quotidian or “normal” transgressions or 
deviations from normality described by Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin (2009), 
Zimbardo embarks on a more grim analysis of character, advocating what he 
calls three psychological truths:  
First, the world is filled with both good and evil – was, is, will always be. 
Second, the barrier between good and evil is permeable and nebulous. And 
third, it is possible for angels to become devils and, perhaps more difficult to 
conceive, for devils to become angels (Sachdeva, Iliev, and Medin, 2009, 3).  
However, although it might invite to more mystification of the issues 
brought under scrutiny, we read Zimbardo’s observations as pleas for achieving 
more clarity and cultivating a more nuanced view of the human nature than 
what commonsense, religion or even some scholars usually advert. For instance, 
the author states that this kind of reasoning in which evil is essentialized and 
“becomes an entity, a quality that is inherent in some people and not in others” 
(Zimbardo 2007, 6) may be dangerous for various reasons, such as: “upholding a 
Good-Evil dichotomy also takes ‘good people’ off the responsibility hook” 
(Zimbardo 2007, 6). Zimbardo illustrates this by resorting to Stanley Milgram’s 
experiment at Yale University and his own Stanford prison experiment, where 
researchers who recruited psychologically healthy, randomly selected subjects, 
showed how, when facing certain situations, people are capable of terrible 
things. 
This idea was earlier argued and analyzed through the lens of Greek 
philosophy and tragedy by Martha Nussmaum in The Fragility of Goodness, 
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where she argued that “goodness of character makes the good life tolerably 
stable in the face of the world. But this stability is not limitless. There is a real 
gap between being good and living well; uncontrolled happening can step into 
this gap, impeding the good state of character from finding its proper fulfillment 
in action.” (Nussbaum 1986, 334). Nussbaum tries to argue in this book how 
goodness can be protected from the pull of these “uncontrolled happenings.” 
Creating laboratory settings for this kind of “uncontrolled happenings” has 
become the systematic tool of investigation in social experimental psychology. 
Most of these investigations actively advocate against the idea of cross-
situational consistency of moral behavior and for a sensitivity of human conduct 
to contextual factors that makes, on the one hand, the goal of judging the moral 
status of human beings futile, and on the other, the concepts of moral trait or 
virtue scientifically inoperant.  
The tendency to see people in terms of good or bad is more accentuated in 
some cultures, professions or contexts and there is a long ongoing debate in 
philosophy regarding the legitimacy of using the notions of traits and characters. 
Some defenders of situationism, such as Harman (1999), propose that folk moral 
psychology is a character trait-based one, resembling virtue ethics. The 
ubiquitous presence of saint, sinners and villains in the lay discourse shows that 
traits are appealing not only in isolation, but also as typologies of moral 
characters that reflect the idea of exceptionality. Also, these scholars are overtly 
denouncing the plausibility of character as a valid construct with explanatory 
and predictive power, and consider it a reified, social construct (also see Alfano 
2013; Doris 2002; Harman 1999). 
Both Zimbardo and Nussbaum point to the importance of situational 
factors, which were, according to the situationists, ignored by generations of 
psychologists unilaterally concerned with measuring and ascribing static 
diagnoses (Alfano 2013; Doris 2002; Harman 1999). The criticism mirror the 
prior Anscombe’s (1958) accusations targeting the defenders of Kantianism and 
utilitarianism, whom he blamed for externalizing the grounds of human morality 
into norms and contexts. Aretaic ethics develops a dispositional and elitist view 
on moral excellence (in Latin: “virtus,” in Greek: “arete”). Aristotle best reflected 
this view in the following passage from his Nicomachean Ethics:  
anyone can get angry – that is easy – or give or spend money; but to do this to 
the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in 
the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; that is why goodness is 
both rare and laudable and noble (Aristotle, NE 2.9, 1109 a26-29).  
Ethical behavior is seen as resulting from displaying such virtues that, according 
to Artisotle, can be learned and developed into habits. Anscombe (1958) claimed 
that modern philosophical accounts, namely the two perspectives mentioned 
above, eliminated or derogated the Greek moralist’s idea of virtue, because they 
insist on principles, and seek to reveal the sources and contents of norms, duties, 
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laws and obligations, rather than to investigate those traits and habits people 
should cultivate in order to live a good life.  
Anscombe’s provocative assumptions stirred the spirits both in 
psychology and philosophy and generated more questions on how these issues 
should be addressed. At the same time with the rising popularity of experimental 
social psychology, concerned with finding the mediating and moderating 
situational factors for moral conduct, Aristotle’s virtue ethics gained renewed 
interest in psychological research and practice with the advent of positive 
psychology. For instance, the most notable and used model is the one 
comprehensively presented in Peterson and Seligman’s Character Strengths and 
Virtues (Peterson and Seligman 2004). The model reflects recent trends in 
personology and personality psychology, more specifically the increasing 
adherence to dimensional models. The categories, including strengths and 
virtues, are organized along a six-units dimensional model of “moral excellence” 
or virtues (wisdom and knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and 
transcendence), based on historical surveys, and further divided into twenty four 
character strengths (e.g. bravery, kindness, and perseverance), which are 
considered to be intrinsically valued, trait-like, and endorsed by societal norms 
and institutions. Although virtues may be absent in some individuals, they are  
perhaps grounded in biology through an evolutionary process that selected for 
these aspects of excellence as means of solving important tasks necessary for 
the survival of the species (Peterson and Seligman 2004, 13).  
In the introduction to this “manual of sanities” (a label borrowed from 
Easterbrook 2001, 23), the authors clearly state that they “believe that good 
character can be cultivated, but to do so, we need conceptual and empirical tools 
to craft and evaluate interventions” (Peterson and Seligman 2004, 3), thus 
expressing their adherence to the traditional perspective introduced by 
Aristotle, virtue ethics.  
From the situationist side, John Doris argues that good character should 
buffer against situational forces that threaten the occurrence of trait-relevant 
behaviors. His understanding of dispositionism supposes this almost universal 
capacity of traits to ward off unflattering reactions within “uncontrolled 
happenings,” as Nussbaum called these situations:   
When a person has a robust trait, they can be confidently expected to display 
trait-relevant behavior across a wide variety of trait-relevant situations, even 
when some or all these situations are not optimally conducive to such behavior 
(Doris 2002, 18).  
Doris’ critique of stability and globalism is based on the low consistency of the 
correlations, the marked impact of situational factors on behavior that 
“undermines the attribution of robust traits” (Doris 2002, 64) and the low 
correlations between personality measures and behavioral observations. In 
addition to this, Doris also discusses the ideographical, biographical accounts 
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that point to the phenomenon of trait disintegration. Besides the various 
criticisms that could be brought to these studies’ validity of results, the argument 
proposed by Doris against virtue ethics does not hold, since Aristotle does not 
advocate an all-encompassing stability of virtue and does not deny the 
vulnerability of human conduct to “unobtrusive situational factors.” 
In a volume dedicated to defending the situationist perspective, Alfano 
(2013) restates the majority of this view’s claims in the light of recent research. 
He argues that the assumptions of virtue ethics, according to which traits are 
stable, have trans-situational consistency, explanatory/diagnostic, and 
predictive potential are mostly invalidated by the experimental accounts that 
reveal the sensibility of human judgments and action to contextual factors, such 
as moods and states induced by various means, including the administration of 
hormones and neurotransmitters (serotonin, oxytocin), or environmental 
sounds and smells. The illusion of traitedness is generated, according to Alfano, 
by the fact that the attribution), function as self-fulfilling prophecies for the 
evaluated person. The mere fact of trait-labelling, enable that people’s evaluation 
create and promote artificial traits or “factitious virtues,” which are different 
from the virtues as they are understood by neo-Aristotelian supporters, because 
these artificially created virtues require social reinforcement and do not possess 
autonomous motivational force over their owner.  
Some authors stress that such polemics surrounding virtue ethics are 
artificial. Kupperman (2009) gave a convincing demonstration on why 
situationism cannot base its claims against the existence of genuine virtues on 
the results of recent social psychology experiments. The appeal to studies that 
indicate the sensibility of moral behavior to exterior influences does not 
automatically function as an argument against the traits approach or against the 
merits of virtue ethics, but certainly motivate psychologists to gather more 
evidence for stability, to find other means to clarify and establish the validity of 
the construct. The problem is complicated by the fact that situationists tend to 
defend a perspective of virtues that does not necessarily reflects its founding 
fathers:  
the character traits conceived of and debunked by situationist social 
psychological studies have very little to do with character as it is conceived of in 
traditional virtue ethics (Kamtekar and Rachana 2004, 460).  
Acknowledging individual differences in moral dispositions (character traits or 
strengths, virtues and vices, sensitivities and weaknesses) does not say anything 
about their modifiability. In the light of the situationist rejection of dispositions, 
one can also easily disregard efforts aimed at enhancing moral behavior and 
strengthening of moral traits, an endeavor mostly advertised by positive 
psychology.  
More recent integrative models of moral personality attempt to integrate 
the tensions between understanding the dispositional bases of moral traits, such 
as altruism (Carlos et al 2009). and virtues, such as gratitude (Emmons 2009). 
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This trend of research argues that personality can be properly and 
comprehensively described as 
(1) an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for 
human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of (2) dispositional traits, (3) 
characteristic adaptations, and (4) self-defining life narratives, complexly and 
differentially situated in (5) culture and social context (McAdams 2009, 12).  
In other words, any approach of moral personality has to take into account 
three levels: dispositional traits – the heritable, longitudinally stable aspect, 
adaptations (that offer more subtle, contextualized explanation of behavior, 
integrating moral goals and schemas), and life stories, or how people conceive 
the good life and attribute meaning to negative life events. 
The research reviewed above suggests that human beings are predisposed 
to implicit, automatic evaluations of actions and offer factual descriptions of 
their past and predictions of their future behaviors as well. Thus, the ability to 
evaluate the predisposition of someone to do the good or right thing and to 
identify someone’s moral strengths and shortcomings is primary. Prior to 
selecting and applying moral principles to the current situation or making 
utilitarian judgments, people are first evaluating others and themselves in 
relation to some aspiring models of what they consider defining for a moral and 
good person. Unfortunately, there is great variability in these conceptions, 
variability that is also visible in the academic definitions of the issue. Psychology 
and philosophy still struggle to provide sound conceptions of “personality and 
motivational structure it expects of morally mature individuals.” (Flanagan 1991, 
35) 
Returning to our central question, we must say we are not concerned with 
finding the best explanatory model for moral behavior and dispositions. We 
don’t ask whether people are accurate in their conceptions about moral 
character (of course, we cannot ignore the fact that it is difficult to establish 
provisory accuracy in the absence of a wide agreement between scholars). 
Instead, we will focus on how people think of moral personality. People are 
intuitive virtue ethicists and, most often, the way they define prototypes of moral 
excellence and virtues, is self-serving. We agree with DeSteno and Valdesolo 
(2011), who, when discussing the malleability of character, argue that:  
Character is the currency we employ to make judgments about people – to 
determine who is good and who is flawed, who is worthy and who is not, who is 
saved and who is damned (DeSteno and Valdesolo 2011, 6). 
We intend to discuss the dimensionality and realism of these 
commonsense frames of reasoning. Our aim is to examine where lay people 
situate in relation to these “theoretical” dichotomies. Our main investigation tool 
is the construct of implicit theories. However, to do so, we need to make sure we 
operate with a valid and sufficiently well-defined construct. The first step in 
construct validation is providing consensual definitions for constructs. This 
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requires a parallel examination of the contents of implicit theories of moral 
characteristics, but also of the empirical evidence related to moral features 
themselves, as it may be found in mainstream psychological accounts. At this 
moment, trait-based models emerging in the virtue-ethics tradition provide a 
rather weak support for the idea of moral traits. 
The Role of Character Traits and Situations in Commonsense 
Understandings of Morality 
The idea of moral behavior as stemming from a set of dispositional features is 
characteristic for at least two accounts that dominate the modern psychological 
discourse: dispositionism and situationism. Dispositionism allows a working 
definition of moral characteristics, while situationism, although it does not deny 
their role and functionality at the lay discourse level, it denies their legitimacy in 
the field of scientific inquiry. 
Among all the competing perspectives in moral psychology, we favor the 
socio-cognitive perspective of personality, which operates with cognitive-
affective units or modules of mental representations that are not context-
dependent, but are sensitive to certain enabling environmental stimuli. These 
include self-schemas, beliefs, construal of psychological and social phenomena 
and situations, hierarchically organized personal goals, expectations and values, 
self-regulatory skills and competences (Shoda, Tiernan, and Michel 2002). These 
models organize and provide integrative and complex accounts of trait domains, 
saving moral psychology from the oversimplifying trait approach and also from 
the tyranny of situation. 
Folk moral judgments are based on a system of norms endorsed by the 
perceivers and on their assumptions and beliefs about people’s capacities, which 
prove to be sophisticated and resilient (Guglielmo, Monroe, and Malle 2009). 
These judgments are often influenced by specific cultural, widespread beliefs 
regarding either theories of the world and how justice is established, or the 
psychological constitution of moral agents. People also differ in their 
assumptions regarding the fairness of the world. For instance, people who 
believe that “what goes around, comes around” endorse the just-world fallacy, 
meaning that they consider that actions are always attracting morally fitting 
consequences that are dictated by a superior moral force that establishes this 
balance (Furnham 2003). A related belief, immanent justice reasoning (for a 
review, see Callan, Sutton, Harvey, and Dawtry 2014) endorses a desert-based 
view according to which a person’s fortunate or unfortunate outcomes are 
causally connected to that individual’s prior moral behavior (“You reap what you 
sow”). According to this conception, a person’s moral conduct, either governed 
by virtue or by chance, will be sooner or later sanctioned by external, immanent 
forces. 
What individuals think of what, who and how is moral is important for at 
least two reasons. On the one hand, moral ideals can be extracted and inferred 
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from moral definitions. People hold certain prototypes of moral personality, as 
Lapsley and Lasky (2001) showed. Secondly, Osswald, Greitemeyer, Fischer and 
Frey (2010) indicate that traits are not only descriptive, inert entities, but 
indicated that their activation influences behavior.  
As already pointed out, people have a sensitive moral compass that tends 
to be calibrated by the type of situation and influenced by the fact that the 
person is the also the agent or just observer. Studies on social perception 
indicate that people think in terms of traits, which manifest robustly across 
situations (Jones 1990; Ross and Nisbett 1991). Based on the reviewed empirical 
research, Doris (2002) maintains that character attributions are generally 
“undercontextualized and overconfident” (Doris 2002, 97).  
This, however, tends to vary from a culture to another (Church, Ortiz, 
Katigbak, Avdeyeva, Emerson, Vargas, and Ibanez 2003; Doris 2002). 
Independence and interdependence or individualism and collectivism are 
supposed to influence the structure of these types of beliefs and claims:  
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique or less integrated 
and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotional, judgment 
and action organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both against 
other such wholes and against its social and natural background is, however 
incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea in the context of the 
world’s cultures. (Geertz 1984, 126).  
Applied to the moral domain, this could be reflected as the degree to 
which people believe in human moral perfectibility, how flexible the capacity to 
overcome habits and vices is, what can be accounted as an acceptable deviation 
from morality and to what degree responsibility is shared.  
Nevertheless, there is not only significant intercultural, but also great 
interpersonal variability regarding how people decide who, how and when is 
good or bad, what are the sources of normativity upon which their judgments 
rely, or how they conceive moral traits, namely their features (innateness, 
stability, educability, globality) and also their contents (“one person’s ‘integrity’ 
is another person’s ‘stubbornness,’ [and one person’s] ‘honesty’ in expressing 
your true feelings’ is another person’s ‘insensitivity to the feelings of others’” 
(Kohlberg and Mayer 1972, 479).  
Meindl and Graham (2014) call this variability ‘lay moral disagreement’ 
and identify three forms in which disagreement manifests. The first two reflect 
interpersonal and intercultural variability in the way behavior and traits occur in 
moral judgments: the degree to which people find traits and actions as morally 
relevant and the possibility of attaching moral valence to actions and behavior 
(Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, and Ditto 2013). The third lay moral 
disagreement is situated at the interface between naive and scientific 
formulations and it refers to the way traits and behaviors are invested with 
moral relevance.  
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Meindl and Graham (2014) find it important to begin the study of morality 
at this last level and recommend to their fellow scholars to pretest the measures 
that operationalize their research variables. The results presented by the two 
authors unfortunately indicate that lay participants do not share the conception 
of researchers regarding the moral prototypicality of traits or specific behaviors. 
The authors provide results of their own surveys indicating which attributes and 
acts enjoy wide-spread agreement regarding their inclusion in the area of 
morality (e.g. fairness), and which traits and behaviors are rather low in inter-
rater consistency and thus, are problematic operationalizations of morality and 
need to be avoided (e.g. cooperativeness, helpfulness). Other studies show that 
there is also great inter-individual variability regarding meta-ethical aspects, 
such as the degree to which laypersons employ moral relativism in their 
evaluations (Gill 2009; Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, and Knobe 2012). 
A class of folk constructions that we take special interest in refers to the 
beliefs in the stable versus incremental nature of character. There are two 
different views: one sees human nature as constant and stable (entity theory); 
the other endorses a more malleable view on character (incremental theory). 
People who endorse entity theories tend to understand outcomes of actions in 
terms of traits, while incremental theorists appeal to psychological mediators, 
situational factors, contextual relations that may have led to the outcome.  
Lay/Implicit Theories of Social Categories. The Special Case of Moral 
Constructs 
The consistency aspect of the concept of moral disposition is notoriously 
disputed and complex. People’s beliefs on what is moral differ in regards to how 
they allocate importance to personal in addition to contextual factors in 
interpreting the rightness of actions. Essentialist lay beliefs understand social 
entities (e.g. race) as rigid entities, with fixed, immutable and discrete features 
that are usually thought as innate, hardwired aspects with biological bases 
(Bastian and Haslam 2006; Williams and Eberhardt 2008). The literature on 
essentialist beliefs converged towards the conclusion that these types of lay 
theories can lead to specific, negative social categorization processes, such as 
stereotypes and prejudice (Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck 1998; Plaks, Stroessner, 
Dweck, and Sherman 2001), perpetuation of beliefs that manifest as grounds for 
system justification of inequalities (Keller 2005; Verkuyten 2003; Williams and 
Eberhardt 2008), and other related phenomena, such as dehumanization of out-
group members (Leyens et al. 2000).  
This rigid type of processing is sensitive to manipulations, and can be 
easily activated (Williams and Eberhardt 2008). Its reduction positively 
influences creativity (Tadmor, Chao. Hong, and Polzer 2013). When interrupted 
and replaced with fluid processing styles of social categories, it lead to the 
adoption of more broad, inclusive and flexible representations of the social 
entities (Slepian, Weisbuch, Pauker, Bastian, and Ambady 2013). The latter 
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study, drawing on the embodied cognition paradigm, shows that simply 
executing fluid movements leads to less rigid processing styles, in contrast to 
essentialist thinking. This is applied mostly to large social categories (members 
of social, racial or ethnic groups) and, as Slepian and colleagues attempted to 
show (2013), there are few reasons to believe that these influences on 
processing styles also affect specific contents describing different types of 
personality features (person-level essentialism). Other factors, such as the socio-
economic context, determine the types of theories people endorse. For instance, 
data from Chen, Chiu and Chan (2009) indicate that in contexts with reduced 
workforce mobility, people adopt more rigid views of the world. 
Judging the intrapersonal and interpersonal variability of moral traits is 
crucial, since this evaluation serves diverse functions. Among others, the most 
important are the task of inferring fairness/justice and ensuring reciprocity in 
interactions (Baumard, Andre, and Sperber 2013; Lerner and Miller, 1978), the 
need for control (Kay, Gaucher, McGregor, and Nash 2010), and the need to 
maintain social ties (Haidt and Graham 2009). Theories regarding regularities of 
moral conduct are important because of their motivational and epistemic 
functions. These theories influence moral evaluation, as it is reflected by a 
research result that indicates the saliency of morally relevant concepts over 
moral neutral stimuli (Gantman and Van Bavel 2014); also, moral construal 
determines evaluation that is faster, tends to be more extreme and to lead to 
universal prescriptions than do non-moral evaluations of the same actions, for 
instance, the pragmatic and hedonic consequences (Van Bavel, Packer, Haas, and 
Cunningham 2012). Moral decision making can be approached, as some authors 
indicate, with different mindsets (Tetlock 2002). Mindsets are domain specific, 
but, as already stated, they are usually organized in a coherent fashion and 
interact with several contextual and intrapersonal variables. 
Implicit Theories of Morality and Ascription of Moral Responsibility and 
Blameworthiness 
Folk psychology is described as functioning analogously to scientific thinking, 
especially when it comes to describing, explaining and predicting mental states 
and actions (Gopnik and Wellman 1992). This perspective is best described by 
metaphors such as intuitive statistician or intuitive scientist, a popular 
representation at the dawn of the cognitivist era (Heider 1958; Kelley 1967). 
However, evidence regarding the vulnerability of human attribution and other 
person perception processes to numerous cognitive biases leads some 
researchers to the conclusion that this view is not just exaggerated, but 
inaccurate (Knobe 2010). The experimental philosopher argues that even if the 
set of epistemic competencies of the lay psychologist would be considered 
basically complete, their efficiency is affected by several factors, which 
disqualifies this knowledge compared with scientific cognition. Unlike academic 
thought, lay epistemics is characterized by many conceptual overlaps and 
Implicit Theories of Morality, Personality, and Contextual Factors in Moral Appraisal 
205 
entanglements that contrasts the before-mentioned view of the intuitive 
scientist. For instance, several classes of intuitions are considered to be skewed 
by moral judgments (Knobe 2010). In contrast to the “theory theory” 
perspective, which describes persons as lay scientists, who rely on a thorough 
analysis of facts prior to reaching evaluations and decisions, Knobe suggests that 
all judgments are influenced by an instant, intuitive, moral evaluation of the 
action. In other words, people’s attempts at understanding the world are infused 
by this pervasive tendency toward moral judgment, which is done automatically 
and unconsciously:  
Even the processes that look most “scientific” actually take moral 
considerations into account. It seems that we are moralizing creatures through 
and through (Knobe 2010, 328).  
This view echoes Haidt’s (2012) position that when it comes to moral reasoning, 
people spend most of their time in rationalizing their intuitions or finding post-
hoc justification of their decisions. This effort shows internal organization and 
most of the views people hold about the nature of the social world, personality 
and their own configuration of traits or their self-concepts are in general 
coherently structured (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997). 
When commonsense views of character are discussed in the 
situationist/dispositionist debate, a central issue regards the dynamics of moral 
behavior, or the degree to which people form, hold and endorse 
characteriological representations both of themselves and of others. The 
discussion of these theories seems to affect people’s evaluations in different 
ways, as the research seems to reveal.  
Responses to transgressions, namely culpability judgments are differently 
influenced by the dominant implicit theory. Entity theories describe moral 
behavior as reliant on stable, unchangeable traits or properties of individuals 
(Dweck, Chiu, and Hong 1995). In contrast, incremental theorists hold a more 
process-oriented view, seeing moral conduct as more malleable, and more 
dynamic. They claim that they achieve more accurate verdicts because they 
consider data and formulate more “objective” verdicts, by collecting data from 
multiple sources and about more diverse aspects of the case (Gervey, Chiu, Hong, 
and Dweck 1999). This study shows that when making attributions, entity 
theorists rely on internal concepts and drag conclusions from a limited amount 
of information (singular or very few instances); incremental theorists, on the 
other hand, reach their decisions by relating behavior to the situation and attend 
information regarding goals, reasons, transitory states, and circumstances. Also, 
entity theorists evaluate transgressions more harshly and propose more 
punitive measures. Thus, Gervey and his collaborators (1999) indicate that when 
evaluating responsibility, entity theorists rely to a greater degree on 
dispositional information about the reputation of the target. Some authors 
provided evidence that not only cognitive (priority over data, types of 
information processing, inferences, ways of reaching decisions and formulating 
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predictions), but also affective reactions to transgressions differentiates entity 
and incremental theorists, with the first being more prone to experience 
disposition-related emotions. For instance, Miller, Burgoon and Hall (2007) 
reveal that entity theorists report righteous anger and moral indignation (and 
other attribute related emotions), in contrast to incrementalists, who display 
anger and disgust, which are related to acts and specific events. Gervey, Chiu, 
Hong, and Dweck (1999) also underlined that entity theorists are pulled towards 
deciding and imposing punishment and retribution. They are motivated by 
vengeance more than incremental theorists, who are mainly motivated by 
restorative philosophies, corrective measures, education and rehabilitation. 
More, Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu (1997) show that entity theorists are primarily 
motivated by conservative concerns, focused on the preservation of the status 
quo, while incrementalists are driven by change and social progress. These 
orientations, in turn, are expected to affect the priority given to specific types of 
information and influence decision processes related to assignment of culpability 
and punishment. For instance, Wurthmann (2013) describes his results on the 
association between implicit theories and duties versus rights-based morality, 
indicating that entity theorists prioritize duties and obligations as a basic frame 
of understanding morality, while incremental theorists endorse a rights-based 
perspective and consider upholding human rights as the central axis for moral 
evaluation. This conclusion has been reached after observing that entity 
theorists show a high moral awareness of violations of duties, while incremental 
theorists are more sensitive to violations of rights. 
Franc and Tong (2014) showed that implicit theories moderated the 
adoption of a more transactional view of moral conduct. More specifically, entity 
theorists were more predisposed to praise their own future behaviors after 
recalling morally good or bad personal behavior, in contrast to incremental 
theorists, who did not display this pattern of over-glorification; in comparison, 
the tendency to believe in the malleability of moral character was associated to a 
lower tendency to commend morally praiseworthy prospective actions. Both 
studies indicate an underlying feature of entity theorists: the predisposition 
towards self-presentational concerns and strategies. 
The Problem with Dweck’s Model. Thinking About Traits in Positive and 
Negative Terms 
In this section we will argue the importance of re-examining the construct of 
implicit theories, applied to the domain of moral conduct. Despite the 
accumulated evidence on the predictive power of implicit theories, other studies 
find no effects of implicit theories about human character evaluations, decisions 
and moral behavior of participants (e.g. Jessen 2014). The natural dichotomy of 
moral traits is an aspect that has been ignored in this research strand. People 
operate with concrete, either positive or negative traits, not with abstract, inert 
constructs (as psychological traits are treated in psychology). They employ 
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labels that function as moral mandates for praise or correction. Unlike other 
phenomena studied with this methodology (intelligence, giftedness, wisdom or 
willpower), the morality dimension, seen as a personal set of features, holds a 
peculiar kind of characteristic, the fact that lay thinking automatically attaches a 
valence to its descriptive terms. 
The distinction between positive and negative traits or character 
dimensions has direct effect on the way entity and incremental theories are 
defined and measured. Since moral traits are conceived both on a negative 
(vices, moral flaws, negative traits of character) and on a positive (virtues, 
strengths of character) axis, the processes behind their understanding and 
inference could be different. These aspects can co-occur and interact, sometimes 
in a puzzling way for the classic personality psychology that emphasize stability 
and internal coherence. They need clear distinctions and workable, sensitive 
models. Proverbs and sayings regarding either the static or the dynamic nature 
of character tend to cover into both negative and positive aspects, and this 
double orientation tends to be influenced by cultural and religious beliefs. Entity 
beliefs that are expressed in folk constructions, such as: “Character is easier kept 
than recovered,” “The wolf changes only his coat – not his character,” “A leopard 
cannot change its spots,” “Like a fence, character cannot be strengthened by 
whitewash,” “Once a thief, always a thief” or “Give a dog a bad name and hang 
him.” Incremental statements can be found in proverbs, covering both positive 
and negative aspects, including various views, such as the possibility to change 
for good (“It’s never too late to turn over a new leaf”), and also for the bad (as in 
the biblical passage: “Your character can be corrupted by bad company” (1 
Corinthians 15:33), and the possibility to build virtues and the self-sustaining 
nature of virtues (“Blood is inherited; character is earned,” “Jade requires 
chiseling before becoming a gem,” “Virtue is its own reward”). We are, at this 
point, interested in how the geography of the character and the mechanics of 
moral behavior take form in people’s representations, and less concerned with 
the accuracy of these statements. 
In this section, we will analyze some conceptual ambiguities and 
methodological flaws we found in Dweck and colleagues’ model of implicit 
theories of morality. A first task in employing this model would be to separate 
the contents of the two alternative types of theories, in order to avoid confusion 
and obtain empirically testable predictions. Although the results of Dweck’s team 
seem to be promising, at least in respect to the degree to which these theories 
tend to bias evaluations and generate more emotionally infused reactions, they 
have been less appealing to researchers in the field of morality. This could be 
generated by their questionable content and construct validity, mostly stemming 
from ambiguously defined conceptual dimensions.   
We acknowledge that this model is not intended as an all-encompassing 
model of traits. When applied to the moral domain, which is, as we have 
discussed until now, dominated by some seemingly unresolvable controversies, 
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Dweck’s conceptualization becomes oversimplifying. When Chiu, Dweck, Tong, 
and Fu measure the degree to which people believe that character can be shaped, 
starting from the premise that individuals conceive characters either as fixed, or 
as fluid, malleable, they allow people to apply various personal definitions of 
character.    
Keeping in mind Meindl and Graham’s (2013) concept of lay moral 
disagreement and Kohlberg’s (1972) view about the variability of understanding 
morality traits, we believe that, in absence of other clarifications, these items 
cannot provide workable results. The reason why moral valence is neglected is 
not clear. The items used to measure implicit theories do not necessarily express 
the view of the educability and malleability of positive moral traits, as 
incremental views intend, but they may very well depict a belief in what 
Zimbardo referred to as the subtle and gradual dehumanization of people or the 
incremental nature of evil. As Aquinas put it, “the evil of mutable spirits [i.e., 
human beings] arises from the evil choice itself, and that evil diminishes and 
corrupts the goodness of nature”. Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu (1997) obtained a 
composite measure subtracted from the scores on the implicit theories of 
morality and of the world. Based on this, they decided to categorize the study 
participants, a decision that contaminates the validity of this study. This decision 
has been assumed and perpetuated by other researchers using this methodology. 
Although Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu define incremental theorists as those 
who “believe that these factors can be shaped, cultivated, or improved” (Chiu, 
Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997, 924), the way they assign subjects to this category is 
problematic. They chose to use only items that reflect an entity view of people’s 
morality (“A person’s moral character is very basic and cannot be changed very 
much”) and decided that low scorers automatically endorse the alternative view. 
Despite this bipolar structure, they claimed that the construct is “unidimensional 
and defined by a unitary idea” (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997, 925), a feature 
that they considered it justifies their decision to exclude items depicting 
incremental theories in the survey. This decision was based on the claim that, in 
the pilot studies, incremental items proved to be compelling for respondents, 
offering a skewed distribution. However, these items are imprecise (“The basic 
moral characteristic of a person can be changed significantly, no matter who this 
person is;” “Even the most basic moral qualities of a person can be changed”) and 
require adjusting their contents with more specific terms, referring to various 
components of human character.  
Based on these considerations, we propose a revision of the content 
validity of the concept of “implicit theories of morality.” We intend to refine its 
dimensionality by introducing the items that were dispelled based on 
psychometric reasons but which invalidate all the claims regarding the 
assignment of subjects into entity and incrementalist theories. As already stated, 
the concepts of character and traits are disputed and fragmented. Even when 
used in their traditional sense in psychology, namely as diagnostic tools, they 
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have some common feature: they are multifaceted and charged with moral 
valence.  
This dichotomy comprised in the evaluative representations of character 
attributes is not adequately caught by the description and measures of implicit 
theories (as proposed by Chiu Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997), whose generality 
avoids the evaluative aspect, and offers thus incomplete and ambiguous 
descriptions of the central traits. The items are the following three: A person's 
moral character is something very basic about them, and it can't be changed much; 
Whether a person is responsible or sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their 
personality. It cannot be changed very much; and There is not much that can be 
done to change a person's moral traits. Usually, participants are asked to indicate 
their agreement on a 6-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 - very strongly agree, 
to 6 - very strongly disagree). The questions force the respondents to fit all these 
aspects in a presumably all-encompassing notion of moral attributes, and this 
choice implicitly suggests that trait-related properties are similar for all the 
involved dimensions, either positive or negative. As Zimbardo pointed out, 
incrementalism can be applied to the development of “evil” traits, negative 
habits or vices and the first and third items can be interpreted in either the 
positive or the negative direction of the moral compass. Also, items the first two 
items cover more aspects, specific to the facets of the characteriological view, 
including innateness of good and bad moral features, educability or, on the 
contrary, dissolubility of virtues. 
In other words, intra-individual variability and contextual sensitivity of 
traits (cross-situational flexibility) are forcibly treated equally, as a consequence 
of the wording of items. Another problem of this instrument comes from the 
authors’ decision to eliminate the items tapping the incremental views. Chiu, 
Dweck, Tong, and Fu (1997) and Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1999) argue 
that the items are socially desirable and maintain that disagreement with an 
entity theory automatically can be interpreted as an endorsement of the 
incremental theory. The authors do not provide convincing reasons for 
discharging incremental view related items and we suspect that their choice was 
based on the need to offer the same type of measure as those already applied to 
other descriptors (e.g. intelligence, creativity, wisdom). Thus, the concept and its 
corresponding cognitive measure should have a more veridical reference and 
precise content, without forcing into the same assessment diverging or even 
contradictory evaluative information.  
The separation between “good” and “bad” positive traits and between 
virtues and vices is necessary and cannot be ignored. The controversial 
semantics of the items just discussed calls for a refinement of the methodology 
used for implicit theories of morality. We propose the segregation of information 
representations on two categories or trait domains: strengths vs. weaknesses or 
virtues vs. vices. When subjects read the item “A person's moral character is 
something very basic about them, and it can't be changed much”, some might 
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think of virtues, while others could have vices in mind. The concept of character 
is multifaceted and includes sets of traits, motives and competencies, such as 
self-control, willpower, adherence to moral desires, values and principles, 
consistency, and integrity. Some moral judgments, behaviors or attitudes rely on 
traits governed by spontaneous processes, while other are more deliberative in 
nature, and thus are characterized by variable amounts of fixedness or 
educability.  
Furthermore, if all these types can be conceptualized as modifiable or 
buildable, the same incremental principle can be applied to vices but it doesn’t 
have to vary in a similar way. In addition to that, once acquired, the virtue or vice 
can be viewed as stable or degradable and we suspect again that this is not 
necessarily due to the fact that they show the same properties or follow similar 
principles. From this point of view, the incremental and entity principles are 
contrary but not necessarily contradictory. They can be logically, but not 
necessarily psychologically incompatible and this dissociation has to do more 
with the complexity of the moral character than with the limits of human 
rationality. This calls for building a more refined set of measures of implicit 
theories of morality that reflect the complexity of the domain. People can 
endorse items from both categories (logically incompatible), holding in mind 
different dimensions of character. For instance, they can consider self-control or 
empathy as a fixed entities, while considering expertise in moral judgment, or 
values as malleable aspects. 
The one-dimensional model of implicit theories is too restrictive for 
understanding moral concepts and traits. Taking valence into account is crucial. 
We do not intend to prove that some traits are normatively blameworthy and 
other praiseworthy, but that they are charged with good/bad, positive/negative 
representational content.  
We agree with Schwarz and Sharpe’s (2010) argument that traits are not 
inherently good or bad, with the exception of wisdom, which allows the 
individual to decide how to act in particular circumstances. As in the case of 
wisdom, other authors describe “moral expertise” as the set of abilities that 
allow the accurate apprehension of moral situations, the capacity to reach the 
adequate solution and also to carry the appropriate act, that ultimately is 
defining for one’s self-concept and becomes embedded in the person’s moral 
identity (Husley and Hamson 2014; Narvaez and Lapsley 2005). Husley and 
Hamson (2014) develop a model that starts from the Thomistic concept of 
habitus that represents the idea that acting on moral beliefs consolidates these 
beliefs and that further increases the likelihood of acting according to them. 
These habits are dispositions towards patterns of feeling and acting, according to 
a certain moral identity, or to strive towards these moral goals or ideals. Taking 
into account the automaticity (often interpreted by moral psychologists as 
intuitive nature) of moral evaluation, the authors claim that this process is 
similar to the formation of habits. 
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Lay moral disagreement indicates that the same behavior can be 
interpreted as indicative of a positive or negative trait, as a function of the 
context, of the perceiver’s beliefs and of induced mindsets. Thus, another step is 
to supplement the instrument with a scale that could measure whether people, 
as intuitive ethicists, are, in the terms of a classical debate in analytic moral 
philosophy, particularists or generalists. Are they recognizing universal, 
defensible and fundamental moral principles, in an Aristotelian and Kantian 
sense, or on the contrary, disregard them, as particularists do (Dancy 1983; 
McDowell 1979; McNaughton 1988). According to the latter view, moral 
behavior is judged only in relation to specific situations. Moral evaluation cannot 
be based on standards and procedures, a position that entails that moral 
pedagogy cannot rely on codes of ethics, but only on the practical experience of 
the individual. 
As particularists regard principles as „crutches that a morally sensitive 
person would not require, and indeed the use of such crutches might even lead 
us into moral error” (Dancy 2004), some psychologists draw attention to the risk 
of treating moral traits in an isolated, decontextualized fashion. Positive or 
negative traits can have both positive and negative outcomes in different 
contexts, either cultural or interpersonal (McNulty and Fincham 2012). McNulty 
and Fincham (2012) underline that the degree to which a behavior or display of 
a trait is conceived as right or wrong, good or bad, syntonic or dystonic, depends 
on its situational appropriateness. In an attempt to bring attention to the 
dangers of positive psychology’s enthusiasm to build positive traits 
indiscriminately, as Lyubomirsky (2012) says, they argue “that forgiveness and 
optimism can have both beneficial and adverse consequences, depending on the 
context.” (Lyubomirsky 2012, 574). However, we believe that people attach two 
types of evaluative valence to trait labels or lay moral concepts: on the one hand, 
an intrinsic quality, which is trans-situational and can be an inclination to either 
good or bad, right or wrong behavior) and a more flexible component, that takes 
into account the situational adequacy of trait-relevant or trait-diagnostic 
behaviors, that can have different meanings, from a situation to another. An 
argument for this property of moral traits is Lapsley and Lasky’s (2001) study on 
moral prototypes. They identified a list of character-central (e.g. kind, sincere, 
and loyal) and character-peripheral traits (lucky, energetic, and independent) of 
the moral prototypes, generated by their participants. The peripheral traits 
could be more sensitive to the situational prioritization of moral concerns, thus 
gaining or losing diagnosticity and moral “currency.” 
Other studies provide evidence that theories of morality can function 
incrementally and be subjected to ontogenetic progress. In an early study, 
Heyman and Dweck (1998) point to the fact that 7-8 years old children have the 
tendency to see character as more stable than other aspects of personality, such 
as ability-related dimensions. However, incrementality seems to be differently 
related to good or positive and bad traits. Children have a tendency to display 
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developmental optimism, as Lockhart, Chang and Story (2002) showed. From 
early development stages, children have a propensity to view positive features, 
both physical and psychological (including moral traits) as invariant, while the 
negative ones are considered susceptible to gradual fading or even dissolution. 
In other words, developmental optimism refers to a tendency to believe that 
physical and moral features are subjected to influences that restores them 
toward more positive states. Newman, Bloom and Knobe (2014) show that 
people attach a fundamentally positive quality to all essential features, in the 
sense that vicious or bad elements are seen as transient, ephemeral, since virtues 
are considered the „true nature” or essence of things, or true selves. Subjects in 
the series of studies conducted by Newman and colleagues (2014) were asked to 
rate situations in which people underwent behavioral changes from good to bad 
and from bad to good. For each type of change, they were asked to rate whether 
this modification was a reflection of their true self, and the degree to which it 
reflected the “true to the deepest, most essential aspects of (the agent’s) being” 
(Newman, Bloom, and Knobe 2014, 204). The data suggest that morally good or 
praiseworthy behavioral modifications were generally considered as inherent to 
the true nature of people: “deep inside every individual there is a ‘true self’ 
motivating him or her to behave in ways that are virtuous” (Newman, Bloom, 
and Knobe 2014, 212). 
Another argument for the segregation of good and bad character traits 
comes from studies that have shown that people do not process positive and 
negative character traits similarly. For instance, Fosatti and colleagues (2004) 
indicate that processing negative traits prompts more brain activation than 
processing positive descriptors. They suggest that the recollection of negative 
stimuli is more important than that of positive stimuli as a survival mechanism.  
Another possibility that could be explored is whether not only the valence, 
but the specific content of moral traits, are sources in variations of 
incrementality judgments. For instance, it is possible that different traits, such as 
the ones described by moral foundations model (MFT), with the following six 
aspects: care/harm for others, fairness/cheating, justice, liberty/oppression, 
loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion sanctity/degradation (Haidt, Graham, 
and Joseph 2009), could be conceived by lay perceivers as following different 
internal rules of functioning, as the authors of the model advocate that they rely 
on distinct psychological systems. The authors of the MFT model have 
consistently shown that liberals, for instance, do not recognize all these 
dimensions as relevant to the moral domain (for more details, see Haidt 2012). 
Given the variability of what counts as moral or not, due to cultural, 
interpersonal and sometimes intrapersonal (DeScioli, Massenkoff, Shaw, 
Petersen and Kurzban, 2014 show that self-interest can dictate endorsement of 
moral principles) differences, maybe more refined measurement of the implicit 
theories should be designed and employed in further studies. 
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If our proposal and attached arguments are correct, then positive and 
negative traits should be judged differently in terms of modifiability, stability or 
educability. It is plausible to find low or lacking correlations between the 
ascriptions of the principle of incremental change in moral character, when 
separating positive or negative features. 
The authors of the model argue that the theories are implicit, tacit, but can 
be elicited by direct questions (Dweck 1999). However, this recommendation 
runs a risk repeatedly revealed in experimental philosophy, a field that aspires to 
compensate the habit of armchair philosophers “to place their own intuitions 
into the mouths of the folk in a way that supports their own position – neglecting 
to verify whether their intuitions agree with what the majority of non-
philosophers actually think” (Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner 2005, 
562). At the same time, there is also a parallel effect, given by the poor 
collaboration between psychologists and ethicists that leads to a poor grasping 
of concepts. There is also the practice of adapting models from one area to 
another, oversimplifying a complex domain such as moral appraisal. So, 
researchers need to take a closer look to the content and dimensionality of this 
supposedly “unidimensional and defined by a unitary idea” construct of implicit 
theories applied to the domain of morality (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu 1997, 
925). We think we need a new model of scales that takes into account the 
differences between the incremental nature of positive and negative traits, in 
both positive (the dissolution of vices and the building or strengthening the 
virtues) and negative direction (evolution of undesirable habits and behaviors 
and the degradation of virtues). Revising the theoretical validity of the concept is 
important. This could be made first by extracting emic definitions of good/bad 
traits, virtues or vices from lay subjects and then the specification of the model. 
We expect to discover various ways in which the concept unfolds on lay 
discourse, for instance: innateness or genetic determinism of good traits, 
character strengths and habits, innateness of the proneness towards immoral 
behavior, malleability or educability of virtues, instability or degradability of 
virtues (reversibility), controllability of vices or character flaws (dispersibility), 
and the incremental nature of vices. These new measures will be related to 
specific criteria (evaluation of the predictions people make based on present 
evaluation, that is, how lay people estimate the patterns of change and stability, 
on both positive and negative evaluative dimensions). 
The conceptual and methodological solution to these issues could lead to a 
more accurate understanding of how people think of the organization and 
dynamics of moral features in individuals and groups. We also hope to bring light 
upon some of the inconsistent findings regarding the determinants and 
consequences of implicit theories.  
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Implications of the Study of Implicit Theories of Morality 
Our question is related to how people think about traits that they so readily 
employ in everyday interactions and to what extent moral traits are permeable 
to external factors. At this point, we are neither interested in debunking the 
components and constraints that affect naïve moral psychology, nor in 
evaluating their accuracy. We only approach folk conceptions of morality with 
the attitude reflected in the following description of the relationship between 
scientific knowledge and folk conceptions of the world:  
whatever may be learned about folk science will have no relevance to the 
pursuit of naturalistic inquiry into the topics that folk science addresses in its 
own way (Chomsky 1994, 14).  
This direction of research will ultimately inform the question of how we make 
moral judgments, and also the answer to how we could improve our judgments. 
Uncovering the processes of “judging” saints, heroes, sinners or villains and the 
specific enablers of the drifts from the sinning saint to the saintly sinner state 
and the reverse has several implications for social cognition and also for moral 
education. 
First we need to explore the literature on moral judgments on how 
thinking about how morality and moral traits operate within the person affect 
the shape of moral cognitions and even behavior. Secondly, we need to test 
whether moral reasoning is malleable and whether folk or naive psychologies 
are responsive and permeable to new information. We could do this by changing 
the valence or the intensity of assessments of responsibility, biasing them 
towards more positivity, or, on the contrary, towards more negativity. 
Recognizing and correcting biases in moral folk psychology is crucial and would 
have an impact on many practical domains where moral judgments are inherent, 
such as justice or governance. This is similar to Harman’s recommendations 
regarding physics:  
Ordinary untrained physical intuitions are often in error. (…) This means, 
among other things, that bombardiers need to be trained to go against their 
own physical intuitions. (Harman 1999, 315).  
Debiasing lay perceivers or reducing the distortions brought by implicit person 
theories could ultimately become a goal of an understudied area in moral 
psychology. 
Some progresses have been made in this direction. Yeager, Trzesniewski 
and Dweck (2013) implemented an intervention which reduces the 
consequences of bullying and victimization. They attempted to shape 
adolescents’ perceptions regarding the person’s potential to change. The 
majority of adolescents endorse entity theories and have a tendency to 
categorize people into typologies such as victims, aggressors, winners or losers 
(Yeager and Miu 2011; Yeager, Trzesniewqski, Tirri, Nikelainen, and Dweck 
2011). Entity theorists were oriented toward vengeance (in other words they 
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prepare a hostile, aggressive answer for the transgressor, are more inclined to 
make hostile attributions), while incremental theorists are more inclined to 
choose prosocial, educational solutions (Yeager, Miu, Powers and Dweck 2013). 
Interventions described by these authors reduced hostile reactions and 
promoted more prosocial responses to norm violations. 
As we have already noted, empirical approaches in moral psychology 
cannot be discussed independently of some central philosophical conceptual 
debates. Thus, analyzing the naive conceptualizations of character would be 
difficult without discussing the ontological status of traits or the components of 
moral character (how we ought to think about character). Although we are 
interested in the form and contexts of implicit theories of morality, not 
necessarily their accuracy, sophistication and elaboration, we are optimistic that 
philosophically informed empirical approaches of folk morality can benefit both 
areas of research. For instance, the debate between situationists and 
dispositionists may shed light on whether the instruments employed for 
measuring implicit theories of personality are accurate. One of the most often 
critique of situationism is that it mistakes the philosophical concept of virtue to a 
different view of character traits. According to this view, traits are rigid, 
associated with habitual or stereotypical patterns of behavior, ignoring the 
reflective, incremental quality of virtue. Other problems arise from the poor 
definitions that philosophers attach to their concepts: for instance, are these 
traits features of normal, psychologically healthy persons or are they ideals, 
prototypes of heroes, saints or other virtuous people. 
Research should also explore whether the evaluative valences of traits are 
stable and whether this proposed dichotomy (on the axiological dimension – 
good/ bad or on the normative one – appropriate/ inappropriate or 
right/wrong) stand the empirical test. Previous research focused on convergent 
validation of implicit theories, and on their predictive validity. There are scarce 
attempts at finding suitable criteria for demonstrating that responses on the 
items designed to measure implicit theories of morality relate to the actual 
tendency toward making dispositional inferences. These new measures will be 
related to criteria such as evaluation of the predictions people make based on 
present evaluation, how lay people estimate the patterns of change and stability, 
on both positive and negative evaluative dimensions. Also, the issue of temporal 
stability is inadequately explored. Several state manipulations or primes indicate 
high sensitivity of the aspects but do not say much about the chronic resilience of 
the implicit theories. We believe that all these issues merits further theoretical 
debate and experimentation from philosophers and psychologists interested in 
both person perception, justice reasoning and moral appraisal. 
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